South Carolina Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 10

Fall 1958

Domestic Relations
James F. Dreher

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Dreher, James F. (1958) "Domestic Relations," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Dreher: Domestic Relations

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
JAMES F. DREHER*

The celebrated Charleston litigation of Simonds v. Simonds1
has made its third appearance in the Supreme Court.2 In addition to being fraught with human interest and involving
the always fascinating subject of money in large quantities,
the litigation involved, during its long life, numerous important divorce law problems and the germs of many more,
but the plaintiff's case finally foundered upon the simple
legal proposition that every litigant must prove his entitlement to an award before he may receive it.
In the 1956 appeal - the most important one - the Supreme Court had refused the wife her divorce on either of
her claimed grounds of habitual drunkenness and constructive
desertion and remanded the cause to the circuit court "to pass
upon whether or not the appellant is entitled to separate maintenance and attorney's fees." The master in that trial had
awarded the wife a lump sum alimony payment of $225,000.00,
but the circuit judge, in reversing the master's recommendation of a divorce for the wife, had not passed upon the award
of separate maintenance monies to her apart from a divorce.
In this situation, the Supreme Court was powerless in the
1956 decision to consider the propriety of the award.
When the case went back to the Charleston Circuit Court,
no additional testimony was taken, and the court, on the basis
of the master's original report, made an award of separate
maintenance to the wife in the same lump sum of $225,000.00.
The husband again appealed and Mr. Justice Moss wrote his
second opinion in the matter. After deciding that the circuit
Judge had been correct in his procedural handling of the case,
the ultimate question was reached as to "whether the respondent was entitled to any relief under the law and the facts of
this case." It was held that she was not. Ever since the couple
*Member of the firm of Robinson, McFadden & Dreher, Columbia;
A.B., 1931, The Citadel; LL.B., 1934, University of South Carolina; parttime Instructor, University of South Carolina, School of Law, 1946-54;
member Richland County, South Carolina and American Bar Associations.
1. 232 S. C. 185, 101 S. E. 2d 494 (1957).
2. Its previous appearances are reported in 225 S. C. 211, 81 S. E. 2d
344 (1954) and 229 S. C. 37,93 S. E. 2d 107 (1956).
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had separated in 1952, the husband had been making regular
payments, varying in amount through the years, to the wife for
her support and had also been paying for the support and education of the children. The wife's complaint had alleged
broadly that the support payments were insufficient for her
needs and those of her children. The Court held that the
burden was upon her to prove these allegations and that she
had failed to do so. Striking in Judge Moss' opinion are his
quotations from the wife's testimony as indicating vagueness
and variableness as to her ideas of what she was entitled to.
Mr. Justice Oxner dissented. He agreed that the wife's testimony was inadequate to justify the maintenance award but
he felt that since the issue of whether the support monies
which the wife had received were adequate had received
"scant attention" in the court below, the case should have been
remanded to permit further testimony on the question.
Upon what theory is this plaintiff entitled to any separate
maintenance and support from this defendant? The Court
evidently felt that she would have been had she been able to
prove the inadequacy of what the husband was voluntarily
giving her, and this upon the theory that she was justified in
leaving his home because of his alcoholic conduct for so many
years. That can be conceded, but does a justification for
leaving in January, 1952 necessarily establish a justification
for staying away in 1957 and insisting on separate maintenance? It would seem that a rather persuasive argument could
be made that separate maintenance is never due to a wife
except for such periods as, her husband's home is in fact intolerable because of his conduct.
If the obnoxious conduct has ceased and the stability of
the reformation has been established and the husband desires
the wife's return, should the wife not have to support herself
if she chooses from mere dislike of the man to live separately?
Judge Moss quotes from State v. BagweZ3 the rule that "marriage imposes upon the husband the duty at common law of
providing the wife with a reasonably adequate and suitable
home and support." The Bagweli case goes on, however, to
say this: "But that the wife owes the reciprocal duty of living
with the husband, who has discharged his obligation to pro3. 125 S. C. 401, 118 S. E. 767 (1922).
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vide her with a reasonably suitable home and support, is
equally fundamental."
Only two other cases in the field of domestic relations were
decided by the Supreme Court during the review period, and
neither one of these was of any general interest. Both were
custody cases and both simply applied recognized principles of
law to their respective factual situations.
In Powell v. Powel 4 the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Stukes, reversed the circuit court and reinstated the
finding of the master that it was to the best interest of a
three-year old daughter for her custody to be awarded to the
father. The divorce had been granted to the husband on
account of the wife's adultery and she had not appealed from
that adjudication. The Court reasoned that this fact, plus
perhaps other evidence of sexual immorality not spelled out
in the opinion, barred her claim of custody as against the
home being offered by the husband and his parents. The
Chief Justice pointed out that in some jurisdictions a divorce
on the ground of adultery is a conclusive adjudication of the
guilty party's unfitness to have custody of a child and that
although this rule is not applied in South Carolina, our courts
have never followed the general practice of awarding custody
of a child of tender years to the mother in those cases where
her want of moral character has been established as the
ground for the divorce.
In Dobson v. Atkinson 5 the Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Taylor, found no error in the concurrent findings of
a master and the Richland County Court that custody of a
child should be bestowed upon the mother. Custody had been
awarded to the mother in a 1956 divorce, and the present
action was to enjoin the mother, who had married an Army
doctor, from taking the child to the island of Kiawan, where
the stepfather had been assigned for a two year tour of duty.
The general fitness of the mother was also attacked, but the
plaintiff failed to prevail on his factual case. On the point
of the child's removal from the jurisdiction of the court, the
Supreme Court was evidently satisfied with the lower court's
requirement of a bond conditioned upon the mother's faithful
performance of the conditions of any proper order of the
court in the matter.
4. 231 S. C. 283, 98 S. E.2d 764 (1957).
5. 232 S. C. 12, 100 S. E. 2d 531 (1957).
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